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CHOOSING PROGRESS
Evaluating the “Salesmanship” of the Vietnam 
War in 1967
Gregory A. Daddis
The weather in Dallas, Texas, on November 19, 1967, was a pleasant 55 
degrees, ideal for a National Football League game. Under a strong perfor-
mance by quarterback Sonny Jurgensen, who threw four touchdown passes, 
the Washington Redskins held off a late comeback by the rival Cowboys, 
winning 27–20. Far from the Cotton Bowl stadium that Sunday, the US 
ambassador to South Vietnam and the top American military commander 
there appeared on NBC’s Meet the Press. In the Redskins’ hometown, the two 
senior officials offered their assessment of a war apparently mired in stale-
mate. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, contesting such notions, believed his 
South Vietnamese allies were making “excellent progress” toward democracy 
while his uniformed counterpart, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, found “an 
attitude of confidence and growing optimism” wherever he traveled through-
out the war-torn country. “We are making progress,” the general affirmed. 
Asked about the possibility of a reduced American presence given such devel-
opments, Westmoreland foresaw “within two years or less that we will be able 
to phase-down the level of our military effort, which means that we could 
reduce the number of people involved.” Viewers that Sunday morning likely 
would have concluded the war was being won.1
Less than three months later, countrywide attacks by the combined forces 
of the North Vietnamese Army and the National Liberation Front swept 
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across South Vietnam. The Tet Offensive, launched in late January 1968, 
not only ravaged the southern population but also brought sharp condem-
nation from the American press. Westmoreland and Bunker were painted as 
accomplices in a year-long campaign, run by the White House, to sell the war 
at home. Though allied forces thwarted the offensive, Tet exposed a yawn-
ing credibility gap that seemingly turned most Americans, even respected 
CBS correspondent Walter Cronkite, against the war. Either senior officials in 
Vietnam were “truly blind” to the circumstances facing them or, worse, they 
had been purposefully misleading the public. Journalist David Halberstam 
believed “the American military apparatus in Vietnam became a vast lying 
machine, telling Washington what Washington wanted to hear and insisted 
upon hearing. The purpose of this lying machine was to propagandize our 
alleged progress in the war and to convince Congress and the American pub-
lic to support the war.”2
Yet were these senior war managers acting unethically by publicly high-
lighting the positive aspects of American strategy in Vietnam to minimize the 
war’s political costs? Were they violating the public trust? Based on numerous 
assessment metrics, one could legitimately portray progress in South Vietnam: 
The enemy was stalemated on the battlefield, at least from a military stand-
point; economic and social development programs were growing in scope and 
emphasis; the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was increasingly supporting 
rural pacification plans; and nation-building efforts were ongoing.3 Certainly 
the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) needed to assess 
more than just attrition of enemy forces given Westmoreland’s mission of 
helping build a viable, independent, and noncommunist South Vietnam. In a 
war without front lines, demonstrating progress proved daunting. Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle G. Wheeler concluded in early 1967 that the 
Lyndon Johnson administration “should be doing everything possible now to 
gain the support of U.S. and international public opinion for our position in 
Vietnam.” Thus, to serve the nation’s interests, Wheeler and others—includ-
ing the president—focused public attention on American accomplishments 
in Vietnam while simultaneously cautioning the war was far from over.4
The confidential, back-channel messages between senior officials in 1967, 
however, proved more forthcoming than their public pronouncements. Per-
haps this disparity between public and private comments, what New York Times 
reporter James Reston called a conversation gap, should not surprise.5 If war-
time assessments appeared contradictory in the uncertain mosaic of Vietnam, 
was it wrong to accentuate the positive in public when private messages were 
less sanguine? How Johnson administration officials transmitted information 
and to whom seemed vital for maintaining domestic support in a war where 
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vital national interests were not clearly at stake. Moreover, by 1967 the media 
had become the “primary battlefield,” according to one foreign correspondent. 
In that critical year, discerning the truth preoccupied nearly all participants of 
the American war: the Johnson White House, the Pentagon and MACV head-
quarters, and major media outlets. At the center of this search for truth stood 
domestic public opinion. As the president and his war managers increasingly saw 
Vietnam as a “race between accomplishment and patience,” publicizing progress 
became an integral part of the war.6 Yet far from a unique case of bureaucratic 
dishonesty, the 1967 salesmanship campaign demonstrates the reality, even 
necessity, of conversation gaps when one is assessing progress in wars where the 
military struggle abroad matters less than the political one at home.
THE WHITE HOUSE AT WAR
By early 1967 senior officials reviewing the war in Vietnam offered a mea-
sured outlook for the coming year. Assistant Secretary of State William 
Bundy believed the prognosis for 1967 “was not comforting.” One general 
officer judged the enemy to be “hurting” but did not think “we’re anywhere 
near the mopping-up stage.” (American deaths in the year’s first half averaged 
more than eight hundred per month, validating such claims.)7 Even Lyndon 
Baines Johnson (LBJ), hoping to extol American progress in Vietnam for an 
increasingly skeptical home front, found little to applaud during his State of 
the Union speech on January 10. “I wish I could report to you that the con-
flict is almost over,” the president remarked. “This I cannot do. We have more 
cost, more loss, and more agony. For the end is not yet. I cannot promise you 
that it will come this year—or come next year.” For a president less than can-
did about the war’s expanding costs, the speech struck a somber tone. While 
Johnson spoke of the need to keep sustained pressure on the enemy, he asked 
Americans for their patience, “a great deal of patience.”8
Patience, however, seemed to be running out. In January Time reported 
growing doubts that “America’s vital interests are sufficiently threatened 
in Viet Nam to necessitate the growing commitment there.”9 One month 
later, Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY) broke with Johnson over Vietnam 
policy, and in March, civil rights champion Martin Luther King Jr. joined 
the antiwar movement. Even a personal note to Ho Chi Minh and a halt 
to US bombing of North Vietnam merely left LBJ with sinking approval 
ratings. In short, the costs of war, now running $20 billion annually, were 
threatening not only the president’s Great Society programs but his political 
authority as well.10 Johnson had to plug the dike before a flood of antiwar 
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sentiment upended what had become the centerpiece of US foreign policy. 
Senior officials consequently required fresh assessments to sustain their case 
for continuing the American-dominated conflict and, ostensibly, upholding 
the country’s prestige and honor abroad. Making the case for progress—and 
continued patience and sacrifice—thus focused increasingly on manufactur-
ing domestic support.
Unquestionably the White House placed pressure on military officers 
to help generate this support. These same officers, however, recognized the 
importance of public opinion. Adm. Ulysses Sharp, head of US Pacific Com-
mand, wrote the Joint Chiefs in December 1966 that the “American people 
can become aroused either for or against this war. . . . It’s up to us to con-
vince our people that there is an end in sight and that it is clearly defeat 
for Hanoi.”11 Despite pressures to feed into this public relations campaign, 
Westmoreland, copied on Sharp’s message, offered a subdued assessment two 
months later. In February 1967 the MACV commander summarized Hanoi’s 
strategy as “a practical and clever one designed to continue a protracted war, 
inflict unacceptable casualties on our forces,” and to “establish a favorable 
political posture.” In March the general admitted, “Military success alone will 
not achieve the U.S. objectives in Vietnam.”12 Little in these official messages, 
meant only for Westmoreland’s superiors, suggested victory was near. Cer-
tainly the general was in a conflicted position. He had to show progress for 
maintaining support of an increasingly contentious war, but he also realized 
this “conflict of strategic political attrition” would not be concluded quickly. 
Westmoreland thus had to justify America’s investment in Vietnam while 
admitting the United States was in for a long war.13
Translating official reports for public consumption became ever more 
important to Johnson, whose approval ratings on Vietnam were slipping. In 
late March the president flew to Guam to confer with Westmoreland, Bun-
ker, and South Vietnamese leaders. Johnson highlighted advances in pacifi-
cation and revolutionary development programs, declaring upon his arrival 
that the allies were meeting “in a time of progress.”14 In private meetings 
with the president, however, Westmoreland struck a sober tone. He noted 
“serious problems” in the area around Saigon, the continuing infiltration of 
North Vietnamese forces into the south, and Hanoi’s unbroken will. As the 
general recalled, he indicated it was possible the “war could go on indefi-
nitely.”15 Asking for an “optimum” reinforcement of 200,000 troops, West-
moreland stressed the difficulties ahead. Johnson thus softened his rhetoric 
before departing Guam. “I think we have a difficult, serious, long, drawn-out, 
agonizing problem that we do not yet have the answer for,” the president 
noted. “We think that our military situation is considerably strengthened.” 
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The day after Johnson’s remarks, the Los Angeles Times seemed unconvinced: 
“The prospects, in sum, are for more of the same.”16
For proof of a strengthened military position, LBJ called Westmoreland 
home in April for the first of several public appearances in 1967. Against 
the backdrop of an antiwar Spring Mobilization march scheduled for mid-
month, MACV’s commander pressed Johnson in closed-door meetings for 
more troops. “With the troops now in country, we are not going to lose,” 
Westmoreland argued, “but progress will be slowed down. This is not an 
encouraging outlook, but it is a realistic one.” Sustaining public support drove 
the general’s concerns. Westmoreland feared that in this protracted conflict, 
attrition of political will at home mattered just as much as attrition of enemy 
forces in Vietnam.17 Speaking at the Associated Press’s annual meeting in late 
April, he acknowledged that he did “not see any end to the war in sight,” yet 
as long as Americans remained determined, the war still could be won. While 
the Washington Post hailed the “admirably forthright report,” critics latched 
onto Westmoreland’s contention that the enemy saw “protest as evidence of 
crumbling morale and diminishing resolve” at home. By disparaging legiti-
mate dissent, Senator Thruston B. Morton (KY-R) argued, the general was 
only adding to the controversy. Johnson’s plan to silence critics by bringing 
MACV’s commander home had backfired.18
Westmoreland generated further debate when addressing a joint session of 
Congress on April 28. Carefully avoiding the word “victory,” he cited heavy 
enemy combat losses, an increasing number of defectors rallying to Saigon’s 
South Vietnamese government (GVN), and progress within the South Viet-
namese Army ranks as evidence of forward momentum. Though the speech 
was “warmly received,” according to the Washington Post, Westmoreland 
“made no converts to the policies he is carrying out in Vietnam.”19 In fact, 
critics pointed to the general’s unprecedented call home to endorse an ongoing 
war as proof that Johnson’s Vietnam policy was plagued with inconsistencies. 
Senator George McGovern (D-SD), believing Westmoreland’s visit aimed to 
stifle criticism, proclaimed that deepening US involvement in Vietnam rep-
resented “the most tragic diplomatic and moral failure in our national experi-
ence.” Senator J. William Fulbright (D-AR), chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, thought from a military standpoint Westmoreland’s 
speech was fine. But he disagreed with Westmoreland, remarking that “the 
point is the policy that put our boys over there.” While numerous congres-
sional leaders and editorial writers sided with Westmoreland in the following 
days, Johnson’s aim of mobilizing domestic support was coming up short.20
Moreover, concerns among the president’s inner circle over reinforcements 
and a potentially expanding war surfaced in mid-May. For more than a year, 
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Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had been privately questioning 
American strategy in Vietnam. In February he openly described the limita-
tions of the US bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Then on May 19 
he drafted Johnson an honest, if not anguished, critique of Vietnam policy. 
There was “rot in the fabric” of South Vietnamese society, McNamara opined. 
Pacification efforts were faltering, corruption was widespread, and the popu-
lation remained apathetic to the war’s outcome. Hanoi’s resolve, meanwhile, 
was far from broken. Challenging Westmoreland’s request for additional 
troops, McNamara argued the “war in Vietnam is acquiring a momentum of 
its own and that must be stopped.”21 In short with unresolved GVN deficien-
cies, Americans would achieve nothing more than a stalemate. As McNamara 
asked long after the war, “If the South Vietnamese government, such as it 
was, could not gain and keep its people’s support and defeat the insurgents, 
could we do it for them?”22
While claims Saigon was not shouldering enough of the burden were 
unfair—anticommunist South Vietnamese had been fighting since Indo-
china’s partition in 1954—contemporary assessments for President Johnson 
candidly depicted the political and military struggles inside South Vietnam. 
These faithfully presented reports rested on solid evidence, at least from 
their authors’ perspectives. Even under pressure from LBJ, Westmoreland, 
McNamara, and other senior officials privately gave the president their honest 
appraisal of the war. The White House, though, still contended with flagging 
domestic support. Thus, when Westmoreland returned home in July for his 
mother’s funeral, Johnson called a hasty news conference with Westmore-
land, McNamara, and Joint Chiefs chairman Wheeler. While the president 
described both the successes and shortcomings in Vietnam, he was generally 
pleased with the progress being made. “We are very sure that we are on the 
right track.” Taking a few questions, LBJ turned to Westmoreland and asked 
if he could briefly “touch on this ‘stalemate’ creature.” In front of reporters, 
the general replied dutifully, “The statement that we are in a stalemate is com-
plete fiction. It is completely unrealistic.”23
BACK CHANNELS
Without question Westmoreland proved more candid with his confidential 
assessments and military advice. This private narrative demonstrated not only 
the war’s complexity but also the general’s concerns over a prolonged conflict. 
His concept of operations for 1967 highlighted MACV’s primary mission to 
“support the Vietnamese government and its armed forces and coalesce the 
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military efforts (and civilian efforts as appropriate) of the GVN and Free World 
Military Assistance Forces in defeating the Communist insurgents and aggres-
sors from the North, expanding security in populated and productive areas, 
and encouraging and supporting all aspects of nation building.”24 Here was an 
immense task. When National Security Adviser Walt Rostow forwarded West-
moreland’s concept to the president in January, he underlined several “unre-
solved problems” in the general’s report. Among MACV’s greatest concerns, 
none ranked more important than expanding security so pacification efforts 
could succeed. While acknowledging enemy difficulties, the general thought 
Hanoi probably would “continue his protracted war” well into 1967. No sur-
prise then that at a high-level conference of GVN and American leaders in 
Guam, Westmoreland suggested, “As things stand now it may take ten years.”25
MACV’s chief problem remained one of accurately evaluating the war’s 
progress to make such claims. Even assessing conventional operations such as 
Cedar Falls and Junction City proved nettlesome. Both campaigns, intended 
to destroy Communist forces and infrastructure, amassed high numbers 
of enemy killed and supplies captured. Four months after these operations 
ended, Ambassador Bunker reported that the “enemy has been badly hurt, has 
been kept off balance, and his time schedule has been disrupted.” Westmore-
land, though, tempered such optimism, informing Johnson that enemy forces 
had not been reduced because “heavy infiltration and continuing recruitment 
in the South were making up for battle casualties.”26 Body counts told only 
part of the story. Left unanswered was how these operations were impacting 
the enemy’s political infrastructure and, as important, the civilian population. 
Correspondent Jonathan Schell, reporting on allied troops abusing civilians 
during Cedar Falls, questioned how an operation could be deemed successful 
when it had displaced nearly six thousand refugees from the local population.27
Equally difficult to ascertain was the willpower of Hanoi’s leadership, 
ostensibly a key target of US military power in Southeast Asia. Relying on 
captured documents and prisoner interrogations, Westmoreland could only 
guess at Hanoi’s intentions for 1967. MACV believed the enemy would seek 
a battlefield victory, “not with the intent to hold ground permanently, but 
rather to create a psychological shock designed to affect U.S. public opinion 
against continuation of the war, to bolster his own morale, or to improve his 
position for negotiation or further combat.”28 In truth Hanoi’s Politburo heat-
edly debated its strategic options during 1967. While some party members 
advocated a diplomatic solution given the war’s increasing costs, First Secre-
tary Le Duan insisted upon seeking a decisive battlefield victory. Though the 
1968 Tet Offensive would prove Westmoreland’s earlier concerns prescient, 
he was unaware of any dissension within the enemy’s camp.29
Included in the Chapman University Digital Commons by permission, (C) Georgetown University Press. 
180 Daddis
On the American side, debate over strategy proved more public and often 
centered on what critics perceived as an omission of essential facts on the war’s 
progress. By early July newspapers were openly contesting official reports on 
Vietnam. Erwin Canham of the Christian Science Monitor supposed that “the 
American people have never been more discouraged about Vietnam than they 
are now,” while Drew Pearson of the Los Angeles Times wrote of a “standstill 
in Vietnam.”30 As MACV officials reasoned they “must convince Washing-
ton that there is something more than stalemate in prospect,” key questions 
remained. Who was the audience for public progress reports? Were they gen-
erated to provide political support for the White House? Did Westmoreland 
feel the need to be a public advocate for his own soldiers or to buoy morale 
inside South Vietnam and generate support for the Saigon government? Cer-
tainly airing doubts about the GVN and its armed forces called into question 
the war itself. Journalist Joseph Kraft, for instance, claimed that “in blaming 
the continuing war on American public opinion,” MACV was covering up 
“the true failure in Vietnam,” the South Vietnamese Army.31
Westmoreland was all too cognizant of the faltering public support, yet 
there is little evidence to suggest he changed his assessments, either publicly 
or privately, to help sell the war. When Wheeler asked the general in March 
to report on the bombing campaign’s positive results, Westmoreland declined 
because he found scant evidence supporting a bright assessment.32 This is not 
to say MACV was mired in pessimism as 1967 wore on. It was not. Monthly 
evaluations spoke of measured progress even if the enemy’s determination 
remained unbroken. While MACV’s June report admitted “little direct prog-
ress was achieved” in meeting the year’s campaign plan goals, it otherwise 
hit an upbeat tone. Reporting on operations in July, Westmoreland spoke 
of increased enemy losses, progress in revolutionary development programs, 
and how units of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam were “continuing to 
improve in all areas.” The general’s civilian counterparts agreed. Ambassador 
Robert Komer, head of MACV’s civil operations branch, wrote the president 
in July that “at long last we are slowly but surely winning [the] war of attrition 
in [the] South.”33
Of course, optimism had purpose. As foreign policy experts Leslie Gelb 
and Richard Betts have argued, positive news “was seen as a job well done; 
bad news represented failure. Moreover, optimism bred optimism so that it 
was difficult not to continue it.”34 Whether cultural—Americans generally 
value performance—or organizational, senior military leaders were hesitant 
to share their personal doubts in public. Westmoreland, for example, was 
serving not only as the chief advocate for his president’s war in Southeast 
Asia but also as the head of a military organization expected to defeat a Third 
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World country’s military forces. Yet the general also knew full well that over-
optimism destroyed the credibility of his predecessor, Gen. Paul Harkins. 
Thus, Westmoreland approached the press carefully. As journalist Ward Just 
recalled, MACV’s commander “never predicted when the war would end, nor 
would he forecast the end of the beginning or the beginning of the end, or 
when the corner would be turned or if, indeed, there was a corner.”35 As such, 
the very definition of “winning” seemed perpetually open to interrogation.
Making matters worse, the question “How are we doing?” remained a mys-
tery in 1967. Staffs from multiple agencies—MACV, the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the US Agency for International Development—counted hun-
dreds of metrics but never achieved consensus on the vector of progress. Was 
it moving in a positive, upward direction or not? The sheer complexity of tasks 
required by Westmoreland’s comprehensive strategy made any assessment 
difficult. MACV’s concept involved denying enemy infiltration into South 
Vietnam, securing the population, opening roads and waterways, fighting 
the enemy’s main forces, blocking an invasion, and supporting revolutionary 
development programs.36 These tasks were related, yet progress in one area did 
not guarantee progress elsewhere. A successful search-and-destroy operation, 
for instance, might create refugees, an outcome that undermined pacification 
efforts. One CIA report suggested the “ideal would be a single ‘Dow Jones’ 
index of how the war is going, but such an index is not currently feasible.” 
No wonder reporters in late summer began speaking of the “ever-widening 
gap” between the assessments of senior officials and lower-echelon field com-
manders.37 The war’s interactive, and thus fluid, nature between Washington, 
Hanoi, and Saigon meant few could agree on the war’s true rate of progress.
Senior Washington officials certainly received mixed messages from Sai-
gon. Even during John F. Kennedy’s administration, single reports contained 
internal contradictions on the political and military struggle inside South 
Vietnam. Little had changed by 1967. Conflicting views flooded the White 
House, some from individual advisers. The secretary of defense noted “sub-
stantial progress” in military operations, yet he conceded there was “not 
equivalent progress in the pacification program.”38 In fact, McNamara was a 
prime example of publicly communicating a positive picture while express-
ing deep-seated concerns in private. In July the secretary proclaimed, “More 
progress had been made in the Vietnam war in the last nine months than in 
the previous six years.” Yet to the president, McNamara advised that “contin-
uation of our current course of action in Southeast Asia would be dangerous, 
costly, and unsatisfactory to our people.” By late summer, however, Johnson 
felt incapable of changing course. Rather than reconcile the competing inter-
pretations of what many believed was a stalemated war, LBJ decided upon a 
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more forceful public relations campaign to convince Americans the war was 
being won.39
Ambiguous evidence, however, failed to support such claims. The so-called 
order of battle controversy, coming to a head in mid-1967, demonstrated 
the problems of gaining consensus on the evolving war.40 In open view of 
the administration, the CIA and MACV bitterly debated including “irreg-
ulars”—local self-defense units—in the overall number of enemy forces. 
Deputy MACV commander Creighton Abrams believed incorporating these 
figures “in an estimate of military capabilities is highly questionable. These 
forces contain a sizeable number of women and old people. They operate 
entirely in their own hamlets.” If Abrams missed the potential for such irreg-
ulars contributing to the war effort, he clearly understood the risks of adding 
these figures into official estimates. The general argued that MACV had been 
“projecting an image of success over the recent months, and properly so.”41 If 
irregular forces were included in the enemy’s order of battle, the press reaction 
would be potentially damaging, Abrams maintained. Though an honest dis-
agreement with the CIA, rather than press concerns, drove MACV estimates, 
the controversy clearly revealed the obstacles to gaining consensus on the 
question “how are we doing?”
In reality deliberations unfolding in backchannel messages, often beyond 
public view, suggested the impenetrability of what largely, if not exclusively, 
was a Vietnamese problem. In the end the entire US mission in Vietnam 
rested on how well the Americans were supporting the development of a legit-
imate, stable GVN. In this crucial aspect of strategy, Westmoreland and others 
expressed their deepest concerns. Field commanders found it difficult to gain 
the trust of the population while Johnson’s advisers believed “most Vietnamese 
are politically inert.”42 A congressional trip report insisted the concept of paci-
fication was “based on the dubious premise that Government control results 
in political loyalty,” and thus “reports of progress in pacification continue to be 
misleading.” Even Robert Komer, a perpetual optimist, recalled the destabiliz-
ing presence of US forces: “If we pushed too hard, we would end up collapsing 
the very structure we were trying to shore up.”43 For a president believing his 
Vietnam policy under siege, there seemed little choice but to push hard from 
a public relations standpoint. And push hard he did.
MANAGING THE MESSAGE
As the summer of 1967 wore on, disparate assessments of the war seemed the 
new norm. The American public read some news reports hailing progress as 
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other journalists used words such as “quagmire” to describe Vietnam. A late 
July Gallup poll found 52 percent of the nation disapproved of Johnson’s 
handling of the war, yet earlier in the year, the number of Americans favoring 
a “total military victory” rose by more than 10 percent. The president might 
argue his critics were misinformed, but LBJ stood partly to blame. As spe-
cial counsel to the president Harry McPherson recalled, Johnson “sent out 
confusing signals to the public. We must win; but ‘victory’ was not our goal. 
The men of Hanoi were the enemies of freedom and democracy . . . but our 
ultimate purpose was to make peace with them.”44 Thus, not only did the 
goals appear contradictory but the momentum toward achieving them did as 
well. How could Westmoreland, for instance, be making progress yet request-
ing reinforcements? Though senior military leaders railed against “imma-
ture, naïve, and hostile” correspondents in Vietnam, journalists more often 
reflected, rather than constructed, the concerns of perplexed Americans.45 
At best the United States was making only incremental progress in Vietnam, 
clearly not enough to bolster domestic support.
Worse for Johnson, those following the war increasingly considered the 
administration’s official assessments misleading. MACV was partially at fault. 
Leaders such as Westmoreland were unable to articulate, based on the mosaic 
of Vietnam, what success looked like in 1967. As Komer wrote the pres-
ident: “The whole trouble with analyzing this peculiar war is that it is so 
fragmented—so much a matter of little things happening everywhere—that 
the results are barely visible to the untrained eye.”46 Perhaps unsurprising the 
Joint Chiefs chairman wrote Westmoreland in early August about his con-
cerns regarding the war. Wheeler thought MACV should “prepare a precise, 
factual, non-generalized case to explain why we are making progress rather 
than facing a stalemate in Vietnam.” Westmoreland responded by accusing 
“a vocal segment of the news profession” of “equating a lack of major combat 
operations such as Cedar Falls and Junction City with a stalemate at best, or 
a loss of the initiative on our part at worst. Nothing could be farther from 
the truth.” Rather than censor the press—the command would pay “a terrible 
price for it”—Westmoreland instead increased his number of news confer-
ences and strove “to talk personally with more newsmen and to take as many 
as possible on field trips with us.”47
The message, however, seemed only to sour. On August 7 the New York 
Times printed R. W. Apple’s story, “Vietnam: Signs of Stalemate.” (Of note, 
the same day US Army chief of staff Harold K. Johnson sensed a “smell of 
success” in every major area of the war.) Apple doubted progress because the 
president, the week before, had authorized an additional forty-five thousand 
to fifty thousand men to be sent to Vietnam. “Victory is not close at hand,” 
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the journalist claimed. “It may be beyond reach.”48 Apple’s article immediately 
attracted the Joint Chiefs’ attention, with Wheeler writing Westmoreland of 
his disappointment that senior MACV officers had been “disloyal” by feed-
ing the story with pessimistic evaluations.49 The White House also took note. 
Though not directly responding to the New York Times piece, the administra-
tion established a Vietnam Information Group in August to better coordinate 
the information campaign. This quick reaction team would seize opportunities 
to “strike a positive note” and break out of the “siege mentality” overshadow-
ing public relations. Still two weeks after Apple’s story ran, the president was 
fielding questions on whether the United States had reached a stalemate in 
Vietnam. LBJ dismissed the charge as “nothing more than propaganda.”50
Clearly, though, accusations of stalemate had rattled the administration. 
On September 27, Rostow cabled Westmoreland, Bunker, and Komer and 
urgently requested “sound evidence of progress.” Senior military officials, 
however, were already complying. In mid-August, upon returning from South 
Vietnam, US Army chief of staff Johnson held a news conference in which 
he declared “significant progress being made” everywhere he went. Less than 
a month later, the general gave an interview to U.S. News & World Report. 
“From the Army’s No. 1 officer comes one of the most encouraging appraisals 
yet on the Vietnam war,” the news magazine exclaimed. In the interview, 
Johnson lauded the “forward movement everywhere” in South Vietnam. 
“We are very definitely winning,” the general professed.51 Internal reports 
from Westmoreland seemed to bolster such claims even if they hedged on 
the propinquity of overall victory. MACV evaluations highlighted the enemy 
losses, the nationwide elections held September 3, and the “emergence of an 
effective Vietnamese ground force.” Though noting “limited progress in paci-
fication programs,” Westmoreland enumerated significant objectives being 
accomplished that fed the public relations campaign.52
Even if MACV’s upbeat assessments rested on sound evidence—senior mil-
itary officials believed so—the overall message gained little traction at home. 
Though Maj. Gen. Winant Sidle, Westmorland’s information chief, blamed 
the media for an “inaccurate and often misleading picture of the U.S. war 
effort,” few news stories in 1967 reflected journalists’ personal biases either 
for or against the war.53 Accepting the administration’s positive messages, 
however, grew increasingly difficult, especially as draft increases brought the 
war to more homes. And though most voters steered a middle course on 
the topic of Vietnam, those leading public discourse had progressively taken 
sides. In the process, the president struggled to satisfy either side of the debate. 
While “hawks” demanded greater action to end the “crisis of indecision,” the 
October 21 march on the Pentagon, organized by the National Mobilization 
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Committee to End the War in Vietnam, laid bare the antiwar movement’s 
growing influence. Despite the White House publicity campaign, Americans 
increasingly found it difficult to reconcile requests for sacrifice abroad to sup-
port a war that seemed stalemated at best, unjust at worst.54
By November LBJ’s inner circle grasped the full weight of public opin-
ion burdening US foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Walt Rostow reported 
McNamara’s concerns that any advances over the next fifteen months would 
neither lead to peace nor “convince our people that major progress has been 
made and there is light at the end of the tunnel.” Undersecretary of State 
Nicholas Katzenbach wrote Johnson on the crucial element of time: “Can the 
tortoise of progress in Viet-Nam stay ahead of the hare of dissent at home?” 
The undersecretary even suggested the possibility of losing the war in the 
United States.55 Still when Johnson convened the “Wise Men,” a group of 
elder statesmen, early that month, he heard few dissenting voices. Gen. Omar 
Bradley felt the “need to raise patriotism.” Career ambassador Robert Mur-
phy urged the White House to orchestrate a “hate complex directed at Ho 
Chi Minh similar to Hitler.” Rostow reiterated his theme of “guiding the 
press to show light at the end of the tunnel.” As the meeting concluded, the 
advisers almost unanimously recommended staying the course in Vietnam.56
Johnson then called Westmoreland and Bunker home to offer yet another 
progress report. Senior officers in Saigon realized the president’s motives. Lt. 
Gen. Bruce Palmer Jr. recalled, “It was obvious Westmoreland was being used 
for political purposes.”57 Two days after his appearance on Meet the Press, 
MACV’s commander gave his most important public remarks of the year 
at the National Press Club in Washington. Dutifully conforming to the 
president’s wishes, Westmoreland offered a laundry list of indexes denoting 
progress, all of which rested on a truthful accounting of allied accomplish-
ments. The press, however, latched onto fourteen words: “We have reached 
an important point when the end begins to come into view.” Westmoreland 
defended the statement, saying it was conceivable within two years to turn 
over more of the war to Vietnamese armed forces.58 But critics saw the speech 
as little more than performance art supporting the president’s hard sell on 
Vietnam. Even Westmoreland predicted that the final phase of his strategy 
“will probably last several years.”59 Such qualifications did little to convince 
doubters the stalemate had been broken.
As Westmoreland returned to Saigon, the chief doubter within the admin-
istration broke ties with Johnson. On November 29 Robert McNamara, 
secretary of defense since early 1961, accepted the presidency of the World 
Bank. McNamara’s pessimism only grew as the war dragged on. In truth as 
early as November 1965, in the aftermath of the first US battles inside the 
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Central Highlands’ Ia Drang Valley, the secretary’s confidence in helping 
transform South Vietnamese society had been gradually evaporating. As the 
White House ramped up its public relations campaign in 1967, the defense 
secretary dissented increasingly with his commander in chief. “I had come to 
the conclusion,” McNamara recalled, “that we could not achieve our objective 
in Vietnam through any reasonable military means, and we therefore should 
seek a lesser political objective through negotiations.”60 Although Johnson’s 
own doubts grew as well, the public relations campaign seemed finally to be 
yielding limited results. Despite most Americans still disapproving of LBJ’s 
handling of the war by a large margin, a Harris poll at year’s end found that 
63 percent of those asked “favored escalation over curtailment of the military 
effort.”61 Low approval ratings and McNamara’s departure may have shaken 
the president but not enough to derail his plans to continue the war.
As 1967 drew to a close, the “conversation gap” seemed as wide as ever. David 
Halberstam offered a gloomy outlook in Harper’s magazine, depicting Viet-
namese society as “rotten, tired, and numb.” Official pronouncements proved 
more cheerful. At the Association of the US Army’s annual meeting in Decem-
ber, Harold K. Johnson offered “clear and concrete evidence of progress”: the 
improving morale and performance of South Vietnamese forces, the prevention 
of a major enemy offensive across the demilitarized zone, and the food shortages 
within the enemy camp. Westmoreland called 1967 a year of “great progress,” 
though once more he qualified the good news by admitting he saw no evidence 
the enemy strategy would change in the coming year.62 Internal MACV assess-
ments struck a similarly confident tone yet equally acknowledged the limits of 
US advances. For instance, MACV reported only a 3 percent increase of pop-
ulation under GVN control for the entire year. Westmoreland conceded that 
the insurgency’s political infrastructure “persists as a significant influence over 
portions of the population.” Inadequate South Vietnamese leadership, in both 
quality and quantity, remained a problem.63 Few of these concerns, however, 
surfaced in public. In retrospect, the year’s final pronouncements of progress 
offered the American home front only selective evidence to continue support-
ing the Johnson administration’s policies in Vietnam.
CONCLUSION: EXPECTING A CONVERSATION GAP?
When the Tet Offensive broke in late January 1968, the conversation gap 
transformed suddenly into a visible credibility gap. As one member of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs asked, “How . . . could the Tet offen-
sive have occurred if things were going so well?”64 In part the answer could 
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be found in President Johnson’s need to maintain support for Vietnam, thus 
setting a kind of moral trap for senior military leaders given the tradition of 
American civil-military relations. Westmoreland never acted out of dishonest 
motives even if he was not completely forthcoming in public. As he recalled 
in his memoirs, he would have been “out of bounds” if he sought to alter 
policy through his public statements.65 Thus, the larger national commitment 
to South Vietnam became the rationale for accentuating the positive. Yet as 
signs of progress became less compelling, the White House’s—and to a large 
extent, Westmoreland’s—conversation about the war became less convincing 
as the country became more polarized. As the war persisted, the problem of 
strategic assessment and the pressure to demonstrate progress became more 
acute. In the process, critical observers wondered aloud if there was some 
bureaucratic veil behind which the real truth lay.
It seems plausible that senior leaders such as Westmoreland were not simply 
concealing bad news but may also have been struggling to understand, even 
make sense of, larger trends in the war. This all raises important questions. 
What are our expectations of senior civilian and military leaders being candid 
in wartime? Veteran correspondent Malcolm Browne believed few: “Honest 
reporting is the last thing most people want when the subject is war.”66 Thus, 
should we expect those in high office, along with their military commanders, 
to acknowledge assessment problems, to be somewhat ambiguous, especially 
in limited wars like Vietnam? Should we expect a conversation gap? As his-
torian George Herring has remarked, the “central problem of waging limited 
war is to maintain public support without arousing public emotion” (italics in 
original). Clearly Johnson had failed at this delicate balancing act. By the end 
of 1967, with the US troop presence in Vietnam nearing a half million and 
with American soldiers killed in action surpassing nine thousand, few among 
the intended audience believed the war was being won. Perhaps the perceived 
justness of their cause deluded Johnson’s war managers into accepting their 
own optimistic assessments.67 Nonetheless, there remained a thread of hon-
esty within the larger quilt of wishful thinking.
All humans, of course, are subject to self-deception, and one cannot dis-
miss the primacy of politics in war. Is it inevitable, though, that public per-
sons shade the truth? If so, is it possible to do so while maintaining one’s 
moral compass? Officers such as William Westmoreland and Harold K. John-
son no doubt withheld the full truth because they believed it would prevent 
some future harm to the war’s overriding objective of creating an indepen-
dent, noncommunist South Vietnam. But politics as they were in the John-
son administration tended to create these ethical dilemmas. In a modern war 
without front lines, it was difficult, if not impossible, for military leaders to 
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inoculate themselves sufficiently against political pressures to sell their pres-
ident’s war.68 Thus, they felt compelled to help shape the changing reality of 
what was an exceedingly complex war. By remaining obedient to political 
authority, uniformed leaders had to construct a reality, based on selective 
interpretation of the facts, that justified continued sacrifices in a protracted 
political-military struggle.
In a large sense, there is a timelessness to this dilemma of the serving officer 
who must speak to multiple audiences about the progress of a less than exis-
tential war without visible decision points and identifiable conventional cam-
paigns. In the Vietnam War the rhetoric of strategic assessment often blurred 
the reality of back-channel appraisals. It seems important then to appreciate 
the vague, if not imprecise, language used to publicly assess the progress of 
protracted wars. Such language arguably requires the public to question the 
relation of truth to any larger wartime assessment. The problems posed by the 
murky situation in Vietnam also illustrate the dangers of overselling progress 
in wartime assessment. The credibility of a government, and its senior civilian 
and military officials, is a precious commodity that is difficult to restore once 
it begins to slip. A lack of confidence in higher officials’ statements leads, 
almost inexorably, to a lack of faith in a nation’s military power itself. Perhaps 
this is the true dilemma of strategic assessment in complex wars without front 
lines. Unlike football, it isn’t always clear who is winning and losing.69
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